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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the impact of tax sparing provisions on the location
choices of multinational enterprises. Special attention is paid to the economic in°uence
of tax sparing because the OECD proposal to reconsider the inclusion of this provision in
bilateral tax treaties is highly controversial. An empirical analysis is proposed in order
to apprehend the e®ects of tax sparing on both credit and exempt investors, since they
do not bene¯t from the same advantages provided by tax sparing. Using data from 54
developing countries over the 1990-2000, and distinguishing Japanese credit investors from
French exempt investors, we ¯rst ¯nd that the asymmetrical sensitivity between exempt
and credit investors relative to foreign corporate taxes is considerably reduced with tax
measures accounting for tax sparing. Second, we ¯nd that tax sparing provisions have
a favorable impact on the location choices of credit investors and have no in°uence on
the location choices of exempt investors. Third, the non-robust signi¯cance of both a tax
sparing adjusted e®ective interest tax rate and e®ective royalties tax rate tends to suggest
that tax incentives on passive incomes are not really considered by both credit and exempt
investors when making the decision of where to invest.
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Developing countries' governments use several di®erent tax instruments to provide an attractive
environment to foreign direct investment (FDI). Tax holidays - under which new established
a±liates are totally exempt from corporate income tax for a given time period -, statutory tax
rate reductions, withholding tax rate reductions on dividends but also on passive-income taxes
such as interests and royalties tax rates, may be used to encourage FDI. The e®ectiveness of
these incentives is however limited by the tax-interaction e®ects with the home country tax
system. Fiscal incentives on passive income taxes are fully o®set by the taxation of both a
tax credit and a tax exempt systems. Fiscal grants on corporate income taxes bene¯t more to
investors coming from a tax exempt system as investors coming from a tax credit system have
to pay taxes on their worldwide income.
For investors coming from a tax credit system, one way to partially bene¯t from ¯scal
incentives is to defer home country taxation until foreign pro¯ts are repatriated. Deferred
distribution may be pro¯table as re-invested foreign pro¯ts should capitalize at a higher rate
than home pro¯ts, leading to a greater repatriated dividend. However, as explained by Hines
(2001) and Az¶ emar et al. (2007), the most direct way to fully bene¯t from ¯scal incentives
is through tax sparing. This provision, included in a large number of bilateral tax treaties
between OECD members and developing countries, modi¯es the interaction e®ects between
home and host country tax systems. Indeed, tax sparing which is intended to promote economic
development, ensure that ¯scal incentives granted to foreign investors by host countries are not
cancelled by income taxation in the home country. In other words, with this provision, ¯rms
are not required to pay to their home country the amount of tax relief granted by the host
country.
As demonstrated by Hines (2001) and Az¶ emar et al. (2007), the existence of tax sparing
provisions in bilateral tax treaties has a substantial positive impact on FDI activity. However,
before concluding that tax sparing has the potential to attract FDI, it is necessary to examine
the global impact of this provision on FDI, i.e. on both investors coming from a tax credit
system, and on investors coming from a tax exempt system, since tax sparing provisions sub-
stantially di®er when they are included in bilateral tax treaties signed with a tax credit or
a tax exempt system. Indeed, tax credit system countries such as Japan commonly provide
tax sparing for tax holidays, corporate income tax reductions and withholding tax reductions.
Investors coming from an exempt tax system already bene¯t from part of these ¯scal incentives
2without the existence of tax sparing in treaties. However, the tax sparing provision negotiated
between exempt tax system countries and a developing country provides tax sparing in respect
to ¯scal incentives on withholding taxes on passive-income only. Apart from the Unites States,
all OECD members have included tax sparing provisions in some of their tax treaties with de-
veloping countries, and roughly half of the countries uses a territorial tax system. Thus to gain
further insight into the global impact of tax sparing on investment decisions, the relationship
between tax sparing and tax exempt investor behaviors has to also be considered.
In this paper we thus try to investigate whether investment decisions taken by investors
which are exempt from additional home country taxes are in°uenced by the existence of tax
sparing provisions. In evaluating the impact of tax sparing on investors' decisions, it can be
further investigated whether tax sparing has the same in°uence on investors coming from a tax
credit system and on investors coming from a tax exempt system. To answer this question,
this paper provides a comparative analysis between the determinants of the location of French
multinationals (coming from a tax exempt system) and the determinants of the location of
Japanese multinationals (coming from a tax credit system) in developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some background information
on tax credit and tax exempt systems, and discusses the tax costs incurred by French and
Japanese investors without and under tax sparing. Section 3 introduces the data and estimation
and section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Some Aspects of French and Japanese Tax Systems
Investors coming from a tax credit system or from a tax exempt system are not subject to
the same taxation in the home country and consequently may not respond to ¯scal incentives,
granted by the host country, in the same way. To investigate the impact of tax sparing on the
location of French and Japanese investors, some background information on both tax systems
can be useful. The following discussion presents the global tax costs of each income concerned
by the tax sparing provision: earnings and pro¯t, dividends, royalties and interest payments.
32.1 Tax Costs Without Tax Sparing
France, as an exempt tax system, calculates corporation tax only on pro¯ts made by entreprises
operating in France, regardless of their nationality. Consequently, pro¯ts made by domestic
entreprises operating abroad are not subject to the French corporation tax, even if dividends
are distributed to a French parent.1 Other capital gains like royalties and interest receipts do
not bene¯t from the exemption treatment. To avoid double taxation, the parent company is
eligible to claim a foreign tax credit up to the value of the home tax liability, for the withholding
taxes paid abroad by its a±liates.
Due to the French tax exempt system, taxes on bene¯ts only occur in the host country. Thus,
French income earned abroad is taxed at the host country e®ective tax rate t
0
h. Depending on
the amount of equity and debt injected by the parent company and licenses used by the a±liate,
the income earned will be repatriated as dividends, interest receipts and royalties, or reinvested.








the host country e®ective withholding tax rate on dividends. Consequently, the global tax rate
of a French dividend payment from the a±liate to the parent is: t0
h + w
0d
h (1 ¡ t0
h).
The repatriation costs of interests and royalties depend on both host country and home
country tax liabilities. Host country income taxes are deductible from interests and royalties,
but e®ective withholding taxes on interests, w
0i
h, and on royalties, w
0r
h , have to be paid when they
are repatriated. Interests and royalties received by French companies are taxed in the home
country at the statutory tax rate, tf, with the possibility to claim a credit for the withholding
taxes paid. Because withholding taxes on interests and royalties are generally lower than
statutory tax rates, they are fully creditable against the French statutory tax rate. Thus the
global tax rate of interest and royalty paiement is, tf.
Contrary to France, Japan levies tax on the worldwide income of its resident corporations.
In order to avoid double taxation of the foreign income, Japanese investors are allowed to claim
foreign tax credits for income taxes paid in the host country, up to the Japanese statutory tax
rate, tj. Generally, Japanese ¯rms can defer home taxes until the moment when the pro¯t is
1Two exceptions to the French rule of territoriality is that French enterprises, (i) may use the earnings from
all their direct operations for the French assessment basis, (ii) may also elect the consolidated pro¯t system
which enables them to take into account their share in the earnings of their French or foreign subsidiaries
endowed with independent legal status when they own at least half the voting rights thereof. These two
exceptional arrangements only apply to enterprises who have requested beforehand such arrangements and have
been authorized by ministerial decision.
4repatriated in the form of dividends. This deferral is available on the active business pro¯ts of
Japanese a±liates that are separately incorporated as subsidiaries in foreign countries. Pro¯ts
of a foreign branch of a Japanese corporation are subject to Japanese corporate taxation even
if not repatriated. Thus the income earned abroad is taxed at rate t0
h for a Japanese subsidiary.
For a Japanese branch, this income is taxed at rate tj , when tj> t0
h, or at rate t0
h when tj< t0
h.




h (Dh ¡ t0
hDh). Japanese
tax liabilities are calculated on the grossed-up dividend payment Dh. Allowing a foreign tax




h (1 ¡ t0
h) and are t0
h + w
0d
h (1 ¡ t0
h) when tj < t0
h + w
0d
h (1 ¡ t0
h), for both Japanese
subsidiaries and branches.
Similarly to the tax exempt system, interest and royalty payments from a foreign a±liate
(subsidiary or branch) are included in Japanese companies' taxable income, although a foreign
tax credit is available. The global tax costs of an interest or a royalty payment is tj, since
withholding taxes on interest and royalties are generally lower than tj.
2.2 Tax Costs With Tax Sparing
From the previous discussion, it appears that a ¯scal incentive in the host country corporate
tax rate and withholding tax rates - addressed to an investor coming from a tax credit system
- simply lowers the amount of foreign tax credit which the investor can claim in its home
country. Similarly, a ¯scal incentive on withholding interest and royalty tax rates - addressed
to an investor coming from a tax exempt system - also reduces its foreign tax credit, leaving
unchanged the global tax paid. To encourage the expansion of their multinationals in developing
countries, France and Japan grant what is referred to as tax sparing provisions, by allowing
their investors to obtain foreign tax credit for taxes not actually been paid in the host country.
Thus under tax sparing, foreign income that has bene¯ted from host country tax incentive
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Table 2: Impact of the interaction of host country and home country tax systems on foreign







Interest payment 100 100 100
Source country tax 15 5 5
Resident country tax rate % 40 40 40
Resident country tax 40 40 40
Foreign tax credit 15 5 15
Source country tax 15 5 5
Resident country tax 25 35 25
Total 40 40 30
After tax interest payment 60 60 70
First, the bene¯ts of tax sparing dealing with active income, addressed to credit investors,
are illustrated in Table 1. The ¯rst column considers a situation with a corporate tax rate of
33% in the host country and a non-resident withholding tax rate of 10%. Then a comparison
can be realized between the after-tax pro¯ts of the investor under an exemption system and
under a tax credit system. In the absence of ¯scal incentives, the foreign tax credit corresponds
to the corporate income tax in the home country. In that case, the investor is not subject to an
additional tax in both systems. When the host country grants tax holidays, and without tax
sparing, the situation of the investor coming from a tax credit system is unchanged. He has to
pay a 40% tax rate to its home country, his after-tax pro¯t is still 60. The result here is that
no tax bene¯ts remain in the hands of the investors, the spared amount is transferred to the
treasury of the developed country. In contrast, when a tax sparing provision is signed between
a developed and a developing country, the home country provides a foreign tax credit equal to
the amount of tax that would have been paid without such incentives.
A similar illustration can be given to explain the bene¯ts of tax sparing con¯ned to passive
incomes (concerning both exempt and credit investors). In Table 2, we assume that the tax
treaty between the home country and the host country provides for a withholding tax rate of
up to 15% on interest. To improve its attractiveness, the host country decides to lower the tax
on interest down to 5%. Investor can claim a foreign tax credit equals to the foreign tax paid
7and if a tax sparing provision is signed, the interest will always be deemed to be equal to 15%
of the gross amount of the interest. For an interest payment received by a parent company,
the home country tax rate is 40%. We consider the investor total taxes under three di®erent
situations. In the ¯rst column the host country imposes interest tax at the maximum treaty
rate of 15%. In this case, the total paid to the home country is diminished by a foreign tax
credit equal to 15% of the interest payment. In column 2, with a 5% withholding tax and no
tax sparing, the total taxes paid by investor are the same than in the ¯rst column, with a tax
base of 15%. The di®erence between situations 1 and 2 is that when the rate of withholding
is reduced, the tax forgone by the host country is paid to the home country. Finally, when
the 5% withholding is accompanied by tax sparing (Column 3), the bene¯t of the foreign tax
incentives is preserved and less tax is paid in total.
To summarize, when a tax sparing provision is signed between France and a developing
country, the tax costs of income earned abroad or on dividend repatriations do not change.
However, dealing with tax costs on interest and royalty payments, the foreign tax credit that
investors can claim is not reduced by host country ¯scal incentives, since it is equal to the
notional tax rate. At this stage of the reasoning we distinguish the host country notional
withholding tax rate on interest wi
h from the e®ective one w
0i
h, which can be expected to be
lower than the notional one, under tax incentives program. The global tax costs of an interest
payment is thus: tf ¡wi
h +w
0i








Dealing with Japanese investors, under tax sparing the income earned abroad by a Japanese
subsidiary is still taxed at rate t0
h. For a Japanese branch, this income is taxed at rate t0
h when
tj< th, where th is the host country statutory tax rate, or at rate tj ¡ th + t0
h, when tj> th.
Indeed, the tax sparing provision allows the investor to claim a credit equal to the host country
statutory tax rate and notional withholding tax rates, even if the taxes e®ectively paid abroad






h)], when tj > [th+wd
h(1¡th)]. When foreign taxes exceed
the Japanese tax liability, there is no Japanese tax on the dividend remittance. In that case,
the tax costs on dividend payments correspond to t0
h + w
0d
h (1 ¡ t0
h). Dealing with interests and








These measures of tax cost will be tested on the location choices of French and Japanese
8¯rms in the empirical analysis.
3 Data and Speci¯cation
3.1 Dependent Variable and Stylized Facts
The data employed in this paper are French and Japanese ¯rm-level data sets. The French
¯rm level data come from a database elaborated by the \Direction des Relations Economiques
Ext¶ erieures" (DREE) of the French Economic, Finance and Industry Ministry. This database
identi¯es French multinationals abroad by plant and location choices. The Japanese ¯rm level
data come from several annual editions (1986-2001) of Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran - Kuni
Betsu (Japanese Overseas Investments - by country). These data are compiled by Toyo keizai,
a large statistical publisher in Japan, as part of its annual survey of the overseas investment
activities of Japanese ¯rms. Both databases are supposed to o®er an exhaustive list of multi-
national location choices, providing, among others, the year of establishment, the host country,
the product and the sector of activity for each ¯rm in both samples.
We only keep in our sample investments in developing countries over the 1990-2000 period.
States with missing information about their macro-economic variables such as Brunei, Liberia,
Libya, Maldives, or Myanmar are removed from the sample. Table 3 describes the total number
of French and Japanese direct investments in each country of the sample for the period studied.
China is globally the leading recipient of FDI, while several countries such as Panama, Yemen
or Lebanon, have no investment from one of the two kind of investors. As depicted by Figure 1,
Japanese ¯rms are largely dominant but irregular on the whole period. The slowdown observed
between the years 1991-1993 is certainly due to the decline in Japanese equity markets leading
to a generalized recession. The surge in 1994-1996 is triggered by the emergence of China as a
desirable location for FDI, whereas the drop after 1996 is due to a continued economic slowdown
in Japan and a declining focus on China. French new plants abroad grows regularly by 3.37%
each year between 1990 and 1998 and experience a decrease in 1999 and 2000.
As displayed by ¯gures 2 and 3, the cumulative distribution of location decisions of French
and Japanese ¯rms in countries which have tax sparing agreements with their home country
(16 countries for France and 13 for Japan) and in countries which have not signed this agree-
9Table 3: Number of French and Japanese ¯rms 1990-2000
Country French ¯rms Japanese ¯rms Country French ¯rms Japanese ¯rms
Angola 11 1 Malaysia 17 657
Argentina 50 26 Mexico 90 164
Bahrain 2 4 Morocco 73 1
Bangladesh 8 7 Mozambique 14 0
Bolivia 2 2 Namibia 4 0
Brazil 120 124 Nigeria 12 3
Chile 65 40 Oman 7 2
China 164 2941 Pakistan 8 17
Colombia 31 14 Panama 0 119
Costa Rica 0 3 Paraguay 6 1
Cote d'Ivoire 47 0 Peru 27 12
Ecuador 3 4 Philippines 40 387
Egypt 7 7 Qatar 4 0
El Salvador 3 1 Saudi Arabia 14 3
Gabon 20 0 South Africa 82 36
Guatemala 7 1 Sri Lanka 8 20
Guinea 4 0 Syrian A. Rep. 2 0
Honduras 3 2 Tanzania 6 2
Hong Kong 114 845 Thailand 12 948
India 46 148 Trinidad Tob. 0 0
Indonesia 5 612 Tunisia 108 3
Iran 4 4 UAE 66 0
Israel 39 11 Uruguay 5 1
Kenya 5 0 Venezuela 23 10
Korea 0 334 Vietnam 143 228
Kuwait 1 0 Yemen 2 0
Lebanon 32 0 Zimbabwe 2 1
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11Table 4: Global outward FDI stocks (million of USD)
1990 1995 2000 Average:90-2000
France 110 126 204 431 445 091 223 790
Japon 201 441 238 452 278 442 252 989
Source: UNCTAD.
ment, gives a ¯rst intuition on the in°uence of tax sparing on both kind of investors.2 If it is
immediately obvious that Japanese ¯rm locations are dominant in countries which have a tax
sparing provision, while concerning French ¯rms the picture is blurrier.
One concern with an empirical analysis considering investors from two di®erent countries is
to what extent French and Japanese investments are comparable. In spite of the large dominance
of the number of Japanese a±liates in the sample studied, it seems that they are comparable
for at least two reasons. First, both types of multinationals are major contributors to the
global investment abroad with comparable amount of FDI stocks (Table 4) and with a large
concentration of FDI in developed countries (Table 5). A higher share of Japanese capital is
invested in developing countries compared to France, however, among developing countries, the
distribution of FDI is largely in favor of Asia and Latin America for both French and Japanese
investors. In addition to be major capital exporters and to have comparable investment trends,
France and Japan have included the provision of tax sparing in a large number of their bilateral
tax treaties with developing countries.
Finally, since we are also interested in the impact of global tax costs on dividend, interest
and royalty payments, it can be useful to have an idea of the ¯nancing mode of French and
Japanese a±liates in developing countries. The literature has established that the level of host
country taxes in°uences the ¯nancing mode of the foreign a±liate. It can be advantageous for
a parent company to ¯nance its investment in a foreign a±liate using debt in high-tax countries
and using equity in low-tax countries (Hines and Hubard, 1990; Grubert, 1998). Indeed, with
debt ¯nancing, interest deductions reduce the taxable income of the a±liate in the host country
and engender taxes on interest for the parent company. With equity ¯nancing, the pro¯t of
the a±liate is taxed in the host country and no taxes are owed to the home country, except for
investors coming from a tax credit country and generally only when the pro¯t is repatriated.
2Developing countries with which Japan and France have signed a tax sparing provision are presented in
Appendix.
12Table 5: Allocation of FDI °ows by geographical destination (percentage)
1990 1995 2000
Japan
Developed countries 73.95 66.9 75.9
Developing countries 25.48 32.86 23.46
Africa 1.78 0.63 0.09
Latin America 8.00 7.55 10.77
Asia 14.52 24.56 12.55
France
Developed countries 96.31 76.73 94.27
Developing countries 3.66 12.19 3.14
Africa 0.02 2.32 0.67
Latin America 1.27 2.58 1.67
Asia 2.12 7.26 0.79
Sources: UNCTAD WID Country Pro¯le. France:
Bank of France. Japan: Ministry of Finance,
International Finance Division.
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Sources: UNCTAD, based on IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, CD-ROM, April 2004 and UNCTAD
FDI/TNC database.
Thus, in the case of low-tax host countries, a±liates are expected to be mostly ¯nanced via
equity. As can be seen in Figure 4, statutory tax rates are commonly lower in developing
countries compared to the statutory tax rate of France and Japan. Information on the ¯nancing
mode of French and Japanese a±liates is not available in both ¯rm-level database. However,
Figure 5 which presents the in°ows of FDI in developing countries by type of ¯nancing, suggests
that equity is the largest component of FDI. On average, intra-company loans accounts for 15%
of FDI °ows between 1990 and 2000. Since ¯nancing foreign a±liates via equity generates
¯scal advantages in low-tax countries, it can be expected that the form of tax sparing con¯ned
to taxes on interests, has a lower impact on FDI location compared to the one con¯ned to
dividends, as fewer interests are expected to come from a±liates in developing countries.
3.2 Control Variables
Control variables used in the econometric estimations are usual country characteristics such as
market size (GDP), GDP per capita, trade openness (trade), country risk (ICRG), bilateral
distance between the host country and France or Japan (distance), and bilateral real exchange
14rate.
The GDP, the GDP per capita and the trade openness are from the \Global Development
Network Growth Database" published by the World Bank. The trade openness of developing
countries with France and with Japan is measured by the sum of the exports and the imports
of goods and services between a given country and France, and between a given country and
Japan, divided by the former's GDP, two years lagged to attenuate the potential endogeneity
bias. The distance data between the host country and Japan, and between the host country
and France are from the CEPII. The composite country risk rating of economic, ¯nancial and
political risks, comes from the International Country Guide Risk. Maximum ratings are 100
and minimum ratings are 0. A higher score indicates a lower risk. The bilateral real exchange
rate between France and a given country and Japan and a given country, expressed as the
number of local currency units for one Euro (one Yen), is obtained by dividing the bilateral
real exchange rate between the local currency and the United States dollar (expressed as the
number of local currency units for one dollar) and the bilateral real exchange rate between
the euro (the yen) and the United States dollar (expressed as the number of euro (yen) for
one dollar). These data are from the real annual country exchange rates compiled by Mathew
Shane from the \Economic Research Service" of the United States Department of Agriculture.
3.3 Statutory Tax Rates, Repatriations Tax Rates and Tax Sparing
The measure of the impact of tax sparing on FDI location is ¯rst investigated via a simple
dummy which takes the value of 1 when there is a tax sparing agreement between the home
country and the host country.3 Secondly, the in°uence of tax sparing is measured through a
tax sparing treaty age variable which represents the length of time elapsed since a tax sparing
treaty has been signed between France, or Japan, and the concerned developing country. When
such agreement does not exist, both variables take the value of zero.
Afterwards, four tax variables are calculated considering both aspects of the tax sparing
provision: the common type one which provides tax sparing for foreign source income, i.e. tax
incentives on corporate tax rates and dividend withholding taxes, corresponding to the tax
sparing provision signed by Japan only; and the one which is usually con¯ned to withholding
3When countries have signed a tax sparing provision within the period studied, they are shifted from the
non-tax sparing category to the tax sparing category in the year in which they switched their membership.
15taxes on passive income, corresponding to both France and Japan. An e®ective statutory tax
rate (ESTR), which considers the advantages of tax sparing dealing with taxes on pro¯ts, an
e®ective dividend tax rates (EDTR), which considers the advantages of tax sparing on with-
holding taxes on dividends, an e®ective interest tax rate (EITR), which consider the advantage
of tax sparing on withholding taxes on interests, and an e®ective royalties tax rate (ERTR),
which represents the advantage of tax sparing on withholding taxes on royalties, are calculated.
The e®ective statutory tax rate is calculated in order to represent the global corporate
income tax liabilities of a French and a Japanese investors, considering both the home country
tax system and the existence of a tax sparing agreement. Dealing with French ¯rms, the
construction of this ESTR is very simple. In the absence of e®ective tax rate data, the best way
to rank host countries by the ¯scal burden they represent, is to use their statutory tax rates.
Since France has a tax exempt system and thus only provides tax sparing on withholding taxes
on passive income, there is no justi¯cation in discriminating tax sparing countries from no-tax
sparing countries in the taxation of corporate income. Thus, in the case of French ¯rms, the
ESTR always takes the value of the host country statutory tax rate, th . Dealing with Japanese
¯rms, the calculation of the ESTR is more complex. As explained in the previous section, to
represent the ¯scal advantage of a tax sparing provision, the host country e®ective tax rate, t0
h,
the host country statutory tax rate, th, and the Japanese statutory tax rate, tj, are required.
Without e®ective tax rate data, one possibility to integrate the advantage provided by tax
sparing, and to discriminate tax sparing countries from non-tax sparing countries, is to add
the hypothesis of tax holidays granted by the host country introduced by Az¶ emar et al. (2007),
and thus to consider that t0
h = 0. This hypothesis is far to be unrealistic since new foreign
establishments with a productive nature are eligible for tax holidays in almost all developing
countries (PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2000), edition 2000 of the `Doing Business and Investment
Series'). Under tax sparing and in the case in which the host country tax rate, th, is less than
the Japanese tax rate, tj, but due to ¯scal incentives, the host country does not levy any tax,
then the ESTR is tj ¡ th. When, th > tj, then the ESTR is equal to zero, since the investor
is considered to be in excess of credit by its resident country even if due to allowances he does
not pay taxes to the host country. Finally, without tax sparing, the ESTR takes the value of
the Japanese statutory tax rate, tj since t0
h < tj.
Afterwards, the construction of the e®ective dividend tax rates (EDTR), is realized in order
to consider the global taxes on a dividend payment. The dividends paid by French foreign
16Table 6: Withholding Taxes Addressed to French Investors in Tax Sparing Countries
Countries Interests Royalties Dividends
Argentine 15 20 0**
Bangladesh 20* 20* 15
Brazil 20 20 20
Burkina Faso 16 - 15
China 10 20 20
Egypt 20 20 25
India 15 15 20**
Indonesia 10 10 15
Israel 10 10 15
Malaysia 15 15 0**
Mexico 10** 10** 15
Morocco 10 10 25
Niger 16 0 15
Nigeria 12.5 12.5 15
Pakistan 10 10 15
Philippines 15 20 15
Sri Lanka 15 20 25
Togo 12 12 25
Venezuela 5 5 15
Source: Bilateral Tax Treaties are provided by the International
Bureau of Fiscal documentation. Notes : - the rate is not ¯xed
in the tax treaty; * e®ective tax rate + 10% (20% is the
maximum). When more than one tax rates is proposed, the
maximum tax rate is selected.
a±liates to their parents are exempt from taxes in France. In the case of French a±liates, the
EDTR corresponds to the taxes paid abroad on a dividend payment and is th + wd
h(1 ¡ th),
where wd
h denotes the host country withholding taxes on dividends. Considering now Japanese
¯rms, their home tax liabilities are calculated on the grossed up dividend payment. Allowing
a foreign tax credit for the foreign tax paid abroad diminishes this home tax liability. To
integrate tax sparing advantages in the EDTR calculation, we ¯rst consider that host countries
grant tax holidays on withholding tax rates on dividends only. At this stage we distinguish two
withholding taxes, the e®ective one w
0d
h , which under the hypothesis of tax holidays is equal to
zero, w
0d
h = 0, and the notional one wd
h, which is the rate in force for Japanese investors. Under
tax sparing and when tj > th +wd
h(1¡th), the EDTR is thus: tj ¡[th +wd
h(1¡th)]+th. When
tj < th + wd
h(1 ¡ th), the EDTR is : th. Without tax sparing, when tj > th + w
0d
h (1 ¡ th), the
EDTR is : tj. When tj < th + w
0d
h (1 ¡ th), the EDTR is : th. This calculation of the EDTR,
called \EDTR1", allows to consider the advantages of tax sparing when host countries provide
¯scal incentives on dividend withholding taxes. To consider the advantages of tax sparing when
17Table 7: Withholding Taxes Addressed to Japanese Investors in Tax Sparing Countries
Countries Interests Royalties Dividends
Bangladesh 5 10 10
Brazil 20 25 25
China 10 20 20*
India 15 20 15
Indonesia 10 10 15
Korea 12 12 12
Malaysia 15 10 15
Mexico 15 15 5
Pakistan 30 - -
Philippines 15 25 25
Sri Lanka 10 15 6
Thailand 25 15 20
Vietnam 10 10 10
Source: PricewaterHouseCooper in \Corporate and Individual
Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries". Notes : - the rate is
not available; * 10 for joint venture.
¯scal incentives are grant on both corporate tax rates and dividend withholding taxes, we need
to distinguish the e®ective tax rate t0
h, which under the hypothesis of tax holidays is equal to
zero, t0
h=0, from the statutory tax rate th, and the e®ective withholding tax rate w
0d
h =0, from the
notional withholding tax rate wd
h. Under tax sparing and when tj > th +wd
h(1¡th), the EDTR
variable, called \EDTR2", takes the value of: tj ¡[th +wd
h(1¡th)]. When tj < th +wd
h(1¡th),
the EDTR is : 0. Without tax sparing, the EDTR is : tj, since no taxes are paid in the foreign
country: tj > t0
h + w
0d
h (1 ¡ t0
h).
Both investors coming from a tax credit system and a tax exempt system have to pay taxes
on passive income earned abroad. To calculate the global costs of repatriation of interest and
royalties it is essential to distinguish tax sparing countries from no-tax sparing countries in the
case of both French and Japanese ¯rms. In calculating the e®ective interest tax rates (EITR)
and the e®ective royalties tax rate (ERTR), we assume that a tax holiday is granted on both
interest and royalties withholding tax rates. Without tax sparing, the EITR and the ERTR
for French and Japanese investors, always take the value of the home country statutory tax
rates, tf;j. Under tax sparing, French and Japanese ¯rms are allowed to reduce their home tax
liability by a foreign tax credit equal to a notional amount of host country tax that would have
been paid had the tax holiday not been in e®ect. The EITR takes the value of: tf;j ¡wi
h, where
wi
h is the notional withholding tax rate on interest, and the ERTR takes the value of: tf;j ¡wr
h,
where wr
h is the notional withholding tax rate on royalties.
18When a tax sparing agreement is signed between France and a developing country, the level
of withholding taxes that can be credited to the taxes owed to the French tax authorities (the
deemed-paid tax rate) is generally ¯xed in the provision. As underlined by the OECD (2001),
this approach has the advantage to avoid the identi¯cation of the amount of ¯scal incentives.
Thus notional withholding tax rates data on interest and royalties come from bilateral tax
treaties signed between France and tax sparing developing countries. To calculate the EDTR,
withholding taxes on dividend data come from PricewaterHouseCooper's \Corporate and In-
dividual Taxes 1999-2000 Worldwide Summaries". In tax sparing provisions signed by Japan,
the deemed-paid tax rates of withholding taxes are typically not ¯xed in the provision. Under
this method, the tax credit that can be claimed to the home country are equal to the gen-
eral applicable withholding tax rates addressed to Japanese ¯rms. To calculate the EDTR,
EITR, and ERTR, in the case of Japanese a±liates, withholding tax rates on dividend, interest
and royalties come from PricewaterHouseCooper's \Corporate and Individual Taxes 1999-2000
Worldwide Summaries". This database has the advantage to give the withholding tax rates
for interest, royalties and dividend by treaty partner. Thus withholding tax rates picked for
Japanese investors are the one which are exclusively addressed to Japanese investors, the same
is true for withholding taxes on dividend in the case of French investors. The amount of with-
holding taxes corresponding to tax sparing countries are presented in Table 6, in the case of
French a±liates, and in Table 7, for Japanese investors. The statutory tax rate data are from
the University of Michigan World Tax Database, and correspond to the maximum marginal tax
rates faced by businesses.
3.4 Econometric Speci¯cation
We create a foreign investment location function which considers host country characteristics
traditionally used by the FDI literature. This location function relates the number of French
and Japanese foreign investments in developing countries between 1990 and 2000. The Poisson
regression model provides a satisfactory framework to model ¯rm location decisions and is
commonly used to study count data.
The Poisson parameter is denoted as ¸ and ln¸ = X¯ is speci¯ed in the application, where
X is a vector of control variables. Denote nit as the observed event count for unit i during the
time period t. The Poisson probability speci¯cation is:






However, the regression property of the Poisson speci¯cation implies the assumption that
the variance of nit equals its mean, which assumption is not respected with the database used for
this empirical analysis. Due to overdispersion in the data, a negative binomial model is required.
This model arises from a formulation of cross-sectional heterogeneity and is used to estimate
models of the number of occurrences of an event when the event has extra-Poisson variations.
The negative binomial model is a generalization of the Poisson model with the introduction of
an individual, unobserved e®ect into the conditional mean (Greene, 2003). Following Hausman
et al. (1984), we assume that the Poisson parameter ¸it follows a gamma distribution with
parameters (°;±) and we specify that °it = eXit¯ + e"it with ± common both across ¯rms and



















where ¡(:) is a gamma function. The omitted variable e"i follows a gamma distribution
with mean 1 and variance ®. We refer to ® as the over-dispersion parameter: the larger ® is,
the greater the over-dispersion (Poisson model corresponds to ® = 0). A likelihood ratio test
indicates that ® di®ers signi¯cantly from 0, con¯rming that a negative binomial model is more
appropriate than a Poisson model in this analysis.
Each country of the sample is at least chosen once by a Japanese or a French investor.
However, all countries do not have the same probability to be chosen. The probability di®ers
across countries due to their characteristics, but not all countries have the probability of being
chosen as some of them are never picked by French investors (such as Panama) or by Japanese
investors (such as Mozambique). The ZINB model, introduced by Lambert (1992), allows zeros
to be generated by two di®erent processes. Two di®erent groups can be distinguished: the
always zero group (A) and the not always zero group (» A). The ZINB model is a mixture
distribution assigning a probability p to the ¯rst group and a probability 1 ¡ p to the negative
binomial distribution of the second group, where 0 · p · 1. The Vuong (1989) statistic test,
which computes a test of ZINB versus a negative binomial model, indicates that a zero-in°ated
20standard model is a better speci¯cation with the sample analyzed in this study. The ZINB
distribution used in the empirical analysis is given by the following process.
The probability to be in the always zero group and in the not always zero group is de¯ned
by:
Pr(A = 1) = p
Pr(A = 0) = 1 ¡ p
and the probabilities of a zero within each group are
Pr(nit = 0jA = 1) = 1
Pr(nit = 0jA = 0) = outcome of the negative binomial model.
Then, the overall probability of a 0 count is
Pr(nit = 0) = (p £ 1) + (1 ¡ p) £ Pr(nit = 0jA = 0)
= p + (1 ¡ p) £ Pr(nit = 0jA = 0)
And the probability for outcomes other than 0 is
Pr(nit = k) = (p £ 0) + (1 ¡ p) £ Pr(nit = kjA = 0)
= (1 ¡ p) £ Pr(nit = kjA = 0)
Thus the ZINB distribution is given by
Pr(nit) =
(
p + (1 ¡ p)
¡(°it+nit)
¡(°it)¡(nit+1) ( ±




1+±)°it (1 + ±)¡nit nit = 1;2;:::
(3)
In spite of the advantage to deal with a database composed by a lot of zeros, one concern
with the ZINB model is its limitations to consider panel data. To address the traditional
concerns in panel data, a random negative binomial model is used in the empirical analysis as
robustness check.4 Hausman et al. (1984) choose the ratio ±i=(1 + ±i) to be distributed as a
beta random variable with parameters (a;b). The ±i=(1 + ±i) ratio has a density function:
4Random -rather than ¯xed- e®ects negative binomial model is used for several reasons. First, in their
study of patent applications, Hausman et al. (1984) using both the ¯xed an random negative binomial models





where B(:) is a beta function. Thus, integrating the beta density, the random e®ect binomial











i (1 ¡ zi)
nit]f(zi)dzi
=
¡(a + b)¡(a + §°it)¡(b + §nit)





4 The Impact of Tax Sparing on Credit and Exempt
Investors
Table 8 presents the zero in°ated negative binomial (ZINB) regression results for the number
of French and Japanese investments considering the tax sparing dummy and tax sparing age
variables. These estimations include the full set of explanatory variables entered in logarithm
and time dummies. The Vuong (1989) statistic test, which is run to obtain a test of ZINB
against a negative binomial model, indicates that the ZINB model is a better speci¯cation.5
However, to control for the robustness of the results and to consider better the panel nature of
the data a random negative binomial model (RNBM) is run on the basis of a Hausman test,
which statistic is reported at the bottom of Table 8. In°uential observations, both in terms of
leverage and outlierness, have been previously removed according to a Cook's D test.
We ¯rst note that French and Japanese a±liates are globally more likely to locate them-
selves in countries where the local demand is high. High trade openness to international trade
and low country risk also exert a positive impact on the location choices of these a±liates.
However, geographic distance which is a proxy of transaction costs such as cultural di®erence
and information costs, is detrimental to FDI. The bilateral real exchange rate, expressed as the
model. Second, parameters of time-invariant variables, such as distance, cannot be estimated with the ¯xed
e®ect model. Finally, a random e®ects model is performed on the basis of the Hausman test of the random
versus ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation.
5Positive values of this statistic are in favor of zero-in°ated model and negative values are in favor of the
nonzero-in°ated standard model. Values close to zero in absolute value favor neither model.
22number of local currency units for one Yen or for one Euro, also has a negative impact on the
location choices of multinationals, suggesting that a weak currency can be seen as a signal of
instability and generates risk aversion. Dealing with GDP per capita, it is not rare to observe
a negative relationship between this variable and FDI because this sign could be interpreted
either as the impact of low return to capital in capital-abundant countries (Asiedu, 2002) or as
the negative impact of high wages (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002).
Of particular interest the Column 1 indicates that the tax sparing dummy has a positive
and statistically signi¯cant impact on the location of FDI. The signature of a tax sparing
provision increases the annual number of new establishments by a factor of 1.7 (=exp[0.531]).
To investigate if tax sparing has an in°uence on the location choices of French investors, we
omit Japanese ¯rms from the sample in Column 2. Interestingly, the coe±cient of the tax
sparing dummy is not statistically signi¯cant, indicating that the signature of tax sparing does
not in°uence the strategic choices of locations of French investors. From these results it can
be seen that there is an asymmetry between the e®ect of tax sparing on Japanese and French
¯rm locations. To go further with this idea we add in Column 3 a dummy which takes the
value 1 if the ¯rm is a Japanese one, and the value 0 if the ¯rm is a French one. This dummy,
called Japanese ¯rms' dummy, is interacted with the tax sparing dummy. The interaction
term is statistically signi¯cant indicating that a Japanese investor is strongly more likely than
a French investor to locate in a tax sparing country instead of a non-tax sparing country.
Indeed, the signature of a tax sparing provision increases the annual number of new Japanese
establishments by a factor of 3.43. These results are robust when a random negative binomial
model is estimated in Columns 4, 5 and 6, with the di®erence that the magnitude of the tax
sparing dummy coe±cient decreases slightly, when considering its impact on Japanese ¯rms.
One potential intrinsic problem when measuring the e®ect of tax sparing via a simple dummy
is to be sure that the dummy does not proxy for other FDI determinants. French and Japanese
¯rms may be more likely to invest in countries with which they have close cultural and economic
ties or which belongs to their geographic zone of in°uence. By extension it is probable that
France and Japan has signed tax sparing agreements with the same countries. However, the
trade openness variable and the distance variable are able to proxy for these e®ects and a non-
reported linktest6 indicates that the model does not su®er from omitted variables. Furthermore,
6The linktest creates two new variables, a variable of prediction and one of squared prediction. The second
variable should not have any explanatory power if the model is properly speci¯ed when the model is re¯tted
using the prediction and the squared prediction variables as predictors. The regression speci¯cation error test,
23in Az¶ emar et al. (2007) analysis, the instrumentation of the e®ect of tax sparing by the o±cial
development assistance granted by the home country, indicated that the potential endogeneity
of tax sparing was rejected.
The use of a tax sparing age variable has two advantages. The ¯rst one is to investigate
the robustness of the results with a variable which should negate the simultaneity bias. Indeed,
the likelihood that the location of new establishments has an in°uence on the existence of a
tax sparing agreement signed twenty or thirty years ago, should be null. The second one is
that the tax sparing age variable allows one to discriminate between the di®erent signers as
multinational ¯rms take time to incorporate, into their investment strategy, the tax sparing
opportunity. This variable is added to the model in Column 7 and presents a positive and
statistically signi¯cant coe±cient, indicating that the attractiveness of tax sparing increases
with the length of time the agreement has come into force. An interaction term between the
tax sparing age variable and the Japanese ¯rms' dummy is added in Column 8 and indicates
that the di®erence in term of sensitivity relative to tax sparing is still observed between French
and Japanese investors. More precisely, the coe±cient of the interaction term indicates that
for one standard deviation increase of the length of time a tax sparing agreement is signed, the
number of Japanese ¯rms increases by 36.15%.7 Corroborating this result, a similar asymmetry
is ¯nd when the estimations are run with a random negative binomial model in Columns 9 and
10.
also generates new variables based on the predictors and re¯ts the model using these variables to investigate
whether they are signi¯cant.
7The estimated impact of the tax sparing age variable for Japanese ¯rms is ¡0:044 + 0:302 = 0:258 in
the equation of Column 8. The percentage change coe±cient of tax sparing age is calculated as follows:





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27We next focus on testing another measures of tax sparing: the e®ective statutory tax rate
(ESTR) and the e®ective dividend tax rate (EDTR). As previously explained, these variables
represent the e®ective tax burden on corporate income and on dividend payment, considering
the existence or not of a tax sparing agreement. To investigate the contribution of these tax
variables adjusted for tax sparing, we ¯rst examine the e®ect of a common measure of corporate
tax rate: the statutory tax rate, on the number of French and Japanese new establishments
abroad. Has can be seen in Table 9, the statutory tax rate is statistically signi¯cant and
exerts a strong in°uence on the location choices of foreign ¯rms since a 1% point increase of
corporate taxes decrease the number of ¯rms by -3.9%.8 The impact of the statutory tax rate is
however expected to diverge among French and Japanese investors sensitivity since both type
of investors are not subject to the same tax system in their home country. As demonstrated
by Hines (1996), Gorter and Parikh (2000) or Gropp and Kostial (2000), FDI coming from
countries practising tax exemption are much more sensitive to international di®erences in tax
rates than FDI originating from countries applying tax credit rules. To consider this potential
divergent sensitivity, we add in Column 2 an interaction term between the statutory tax rate
and the Japanese ¯rms' dummy. The results indicate that Japanese ¯rms are statistically less
sensitive than French ¯rms to the level of taxes. Basically, a 1% point increase of the statutory
tax rate decreases the expected number of French ¯rms by 5.25% and of Japanese ¯rms by
0.55%.
For an investor coming from a tax credit country such as Japan, the advantage of locating
in a tax sparing country is that host country ¯scal incentives do not cause fewer tax credits
for investors. As a consequence, the consideration of the e®ect of tax sparing on the global
tax burden of tax credit investors is supposed to be a better approximation of the impact of
taxation on investor decisions to locate themselves abroad, and should increase their sensitivity
to corporate tax rates. In Column 3, an e®ective statutory tax rate, which is a statutory tax
rates adjusted by tax sparing in the case of Japanese ¯rms is added to the model. This variable
is statistically signi¯cant at the 1% con¯dence level. The consideration of tax sparing seems to
have increased the signi¯cance of the corporate tax rate variable as compared with the statutory
tax rate in Column 1. A second step is to compare the sensitivity of Japanese ¯rms and French
¯rms to this level of corporate taxes, bearing in mind that the e®ective statutory tax rate simply
corresponds to the host country statutory tax rate in the case of French ¯rms. Both coe±cients
8The percent change coe±cient for the statutory tax rate variable is calculated has follow: 100*[exp(-
4.007/100)-1].
28of the interaction term and of the e®ective statutory tax rate are signi¯cant. Interestingly,
when the provision is considered, the di®erence in terms of tax sensitivity between French
and Japanese investors is substantially reduced as compared with the former result, increasing
the responsiveness of Japanese investors to corporate tax rates. Indeed, the ¯ndings indicate
that a 1% point increase of the e®ective statutory tax rate decreases the number of Japanese
establishments by 2%.
To go further with this idea we use two more comprehensive variables integrating all the
taxes paid on a dividend payment, i.e. host and home country statutory tax rates and dividend
withholding tax rates. The Japanese tax sparing provision provides a foreign tax credit equal
to the total amount of host country tax rates, being the statutory tax rate and the withholding
tax rate on dividends that would have been paid without ¯scal incentives. Considering the
global e®ect of tax sparing on the cost of dividend repatriation should improve the prediction
on multinational companies' behaviors. The two EDTR variables are calculated in the same way
excepted that the EDTR1 is calculated under the assumptions that t0
h = th and that w0
h = 0,
allowing to investigate the e®ect of tax sparing when tax incentives are granted on dividend
withholding taxes only. On the other hand, the EDTR2 is measured under the assumption
of tax holidays on both corporate and dividend taxes, t0
h = 0 and w0
h = 0. As expected,
both measures of the EDTR play an important role in the location choices of multinationals.
The interaction term added between the EDTR (EDTR1 and EDTR2) and the Japanese ¯rms'
dummy indicates that French and Japanese ¯rms react in approximately the same magnitude to
this tax rate, since the di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant. From these results, it seems that
the direct protection of ¯scal incentives granted by host country tends to increase the sensitivity
of investors coming from a tax credit system, reaching a magnitude which is very close to the
one observed for tax exempt investors. As can be seen in Table 10, besides lower magnitude
on the coe±cients, these results are una®ected by applying a random negative binomial model.
Considering the e®ect of tax sparing improves the signi¯cance of the tax coe±cient and the
asymmetrical sensitivity between French and Japanese investors relative to tax rates decreases
with the comprehensiveness of the tax measures.
One possibility to consider the impact of the other form of tax sparing - the one which
is con¯ned to withholding taxes on passive income - on the attraction of foreign investors, is
to add to the model the e®ective interest tax rate (EITR) and the e®ective royalties tax rate
(ERTR) (Table 11). As previously explained, both French and Japanese investors have to pay
29taxes to their home country for the passive income earned abroad, with the possibility to ask a
credit for the foreign tax paid. Under tax sparing, ¯scal incentives on withholding tax rates do
not decrease the amount of foreign tax credit that investors can claim to its home country ¯scal
authorities. These advantages may have an in°uence on their strategic choices of location, since
tax sparing can reduce their after tax rate of return. In the empirical work, we use the EITR
and the ERTR to identify the speci¯c e®ect of increasing the tax cost of interest and royalty
payments to the home country, holding other tax prices constant, while retaining the e®ective
statutory tax rate as a separate variable. The EITR appears to only have an in°uence on the
location choices of Japanese ¯rms. The interaction term between the EITR and the Japanese
¯rms' dummy is statistically signi¯cant and is robust to the inclusion of the e®ective dividend
tax rate, in Column 6. However, the signi¯cance of the EITR variable is not robust to the use
of the random negative binomial model (Table 12). The impact of the ERTR is more constant
and marginal, since it has no statistical in°uence on the number of both French and Japanese
¯rms when the e®ective statutory tax rate is tested separately, and when the e®ective dividend
tax rate is tested instead of the e®ective statutory tax rate, as a separate variable, in both
ZINB and RNBM estimations.9
The impact of withholding taxes on the decision of where to invest and on the amount
of capital invested abroad has been neglected by the tax literature, probably because these
kind of taxes are expected to play a more important role in a second step of decision: the
division of foreign income among dividends, interest, royalties, retained earnings or income
shifting, depending on repatriation taxes. As demonstrated by Grubert (1998), the level of
withholding tax rates a®ects the composition of multinational tax payments. Royalties and
interest payments are for exemple highly substitutable meaning that an increase of withholding
taxes on interest will increase royalty payments, the opposite being true. Grubert also ¯nds that
royalties are an alternative mean of repatriation when dividend tax rates are high. The Grubert
(1998) empirical analysis is conducted on US a±liates which are subject to home tax liabilities
on all their income earned abroad, such as Japanese ¯rms. The fact that taxes have an important
e®ect on the composition of payment, depending on the excess credit or the excess limit position
of the company, provides a more comprehensive understanding of ¯rm repatriation decisions.
French ¯rms which are exempt from home country taxes on the repatriation of dividends should
privilege equity investment to have payments composed in majority by dividends. This may
9The EITR and the ERTR are never tested in the same estimation since they are highly correlated, with a
coe±cient of correlation equal to 0.88. Similar results are ¯nd when the EDTR2 is used instead of the EDTR1
as a control variable.
30explain why tax sparing protecting the ¯scal incentives on withholding taxes on interest and
royalties has no impact on their location decisions. Dealing with Japanese ¯rms, the home
liabilities on all type of income should favour the use of substitutable payments and in°uence
the composition of FDI, in order to diminish their global tax liabilities. Indeed, it is more
attractive to use intra-company debt to ¯nance investment in high-tax countries, since debt
service is tax deductible in the host country, and to use equity in low-tax countries. Developing
countries have in majority lower corporate tax rates than the Japanese one, indicating that
Japanese FDI is expected to be highly ¯nanced by equity. This may explain why dividend
taxes play a more important role in Japanese investment strategies as compared with interest
taxes. However, the global non-signi¯cance of interest and royalties repatriation taxes on the
location choices of both French and Japanese ¯rms are maybe simply due to the fact that
repatriation taxes are not pertinent characteristics at this stage of the decision, being where to
invest, and only matters in the composition of payment to the parent companies based on the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Do ¯scal incentives in°uence investors coming from di®erent tax system in the same way?
The existent empirical literature has reached con°icting conclusions. We believe that the most
appropriate way to address this question, dealing with developing countries, is to take into
account the existence of tax sparing provision included in bilateral tax treaties. In the case
of Japanese investors, this provision has the ability to modify the impact of investor's home
tax system on host country attractiveness since it enables the ¯rms to obtain a foreign tax
credit for the taxes that have been spared as ¯scal gifts by the host country. We ¯nd evidence
that tax sparing agreements have a favorable impact on Japanese ¯rms location choice and
no in°uence on the number of French establishments. Speci¯cally, we put forward that this
diverging sensitivity can be explained by the di®erences of investors home tax system.
The statistically signi¯cance of a tax sparing adjusted e®ective statutory tax rate and ef-
fective dividend tax rate corroborates the importance of such provision as a determinant of
Japanese locations abroad. Furthermore, it appears that the asymmetrical sensitivity between
exempt and credit investors relative to taxes on foreign active income is considerably reduced
with tax measures containing the global tax cost of an income earned abroad, i.e. in terms of
host and home country tax liabilities on pro¯t and dividend payments, considering tax sparing
bene¯ts. However, the non-robust signi¯cance of a tax sparing adjusted e®ective interest tax
rate and e®ective royalties tax rate tends to support the idea that tax incentives on passive-
incomes are not really considered by both French and Japanese investors when making the
decision of where to invest.
Apart from the United-States, all OECD countries have signed tax sparing provisions in
some of their bilateral tax treaties. Half of these countries has a tax exempt system and if
we refer to our empirical results, we may expect that tax sparing has a marginal in°uence in
the attractiveness of investors coming from these countries. Furthermore, a similar conclusion
can be reached dealing with the in°uence of tax sparing con¯ned to passive income in the
case of credit investors. The issue of tax sparing raises the question of the desirability to
encourage FDI through this provision. In practice, even if tax sparing in°uences \credit" FDI
in a given country, the costs and gains of this provision remain unknown. The limit of the
tax sparing provision probably lies in its potential counter-productive e®ects which may occur
if tax sparing fosters the repatriation of pro¯ts, encourages tax planning or attracts investors
from highly mobile activities who will move to other country when the incentives will expire.
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36Appendix
Tax Sparing Agreements
Table 13: Japanese Tax sparing Agreements
Countries Date of conclusion Entry into force
Bangladesh 28 February 1991 25 June 1991
Brazil 24 January 1967 31 December 1967
China 6 September 1983 28 May 1984
India 5 January 1960 13 June 1960
Indonesia 3 March 1982 31 December 1982
Korea 3 March 1970 29 October 1970
Malaysia 30 January 1970 23 December 1970
Mexico 9 April 1996 6 November 1996
Pakistan 17 February 1959 14 May 1959
Philippines 13 February 1980 20 July 1980
Sri Lanka 12 December 1967 22 September 1968
Thailand 1 March 1963 24 July 1963
Vietnam 24 October 1995 31 December 1995
Source: Bilateral Tax Treaties are provided by the International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
37Table 14: French Tax Sparing Agreements
Countries Date of conclusion Entry into force
Argentina 4 April 1979 1 March 1981
Bangladesh 9 March 1987 1 September 1988
Brazil 10 September 1971 12 June 1972
China 30 May 1984 21 February 1985
Egypt 19 June 1980 1 October 1982
India 20 March 1969 20 March 1970
Indonesia 14 September 1979 13 March 1981
Israel* 31 July 1995 18 July 1996
Malaysia 24 April 1975 23 July 1976
Mexico 7 November 1991 31 December 1992
Morocco 29 May 1970 1 December 1971
Nigeria 27 February 1990 2 May 1991
Pakistan 22 July 1966 13 February 1969
Philippines 9 January 1976 24 August 1978
Sri Lanka 17 September 1981 18 November 1982
Venezuela 7 May 1992 15 October 1993
Source: Bilateral Tax Treaties are provided by the International
Bureau of Fiscal documentation. Notes : * Agreement concluded
for seven years.
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